Debt, decay and dud decision-making – how Glazers presided over a decade of decline at Manchester United

You could still feel some of the aftershocks of that extraordinary day when listening to Richard Arnold, United’s chief executive, address supporters last week about “renewed optimism and confidence”. There was a tone of pleading — a longing for everyone to pull together — which revealed the lingering scars from May 2, 2021.

For most of the Glazers’ reign, the views of supporters have been blithely ignored, but it is harder to be so dismissive when the doors are being broken down and there are people on the pitch; when the European Super League is exposed as a game-wrecking sham; when the mediocre performances back up every complaint; when recruitment is wretched and, in this past season, a 13-point deficit to fourth place feels a fair measure of incompetence and low morale. Suddenly those fans whom the Glazers might have dismissed as an angry mob seem troublingly representative — and right.

PART ONE: How Manchester United crumbled after Sir Alex Ferguson’s exit

PART TWO: Why Manchester United’s transfer policy has failed so badly since

And so Arnold made his plea for supporters to swing behind a new manager in Erik ten Hag, who is leading a reboot of coaching and playing staff. There have been changes behind the scenes, to recruitment structures, while Arnold himself is relatively new to his hugely important role.

Even Joel “Silent” Glazer has joined the conversation. He has become positively chatty these days; dialling in from the United States to appear on fans’ forums, showing his face for more than ten hours in total in various discussions in an attempted atonement for the Super League debacle.

The club owner who said nothing for 16 years, trying to ignore chants of “Joel Glazer’s gonna die”, has become PR conscious as he trots out buzz phrases about “a new spirit of partnership” and supporters being “the lifeblood of the club”. Most striking has been a promise to “create the largest fan ownership group in world sport” through a share scheme.

“He says all the right things,” Chris Rumfitt, a member of Manchester United Supporters’ Trust (MUST), told The Times after watching a couple of those Zoom appearances.

So, if it were a bit like listening to Ed Woodward, the club’s chief executive for most of the recent past, on those investor calls trying to claim that everything at Old Trafford is going splendidly (if you just ignore all the evidence from on the pitch), are the promises of a fresh start more than just platitudes?

How the world-leaders got left behind

Myriad failings have compounded at Old Trafford over the past decade but they can perhaps be boiled down to this: when was the last time that United did something that looked world-beating? When did they last make a senior appointment of someone indisputably among the best at what they do? When did they last innovate, or excel, at anything?

They were certainly envied across the sporting world when the Glazers took over in 2005 after accumulating shares over a couple of years. When United met Juventus in a pre-season friendly in July 2003, only the Pope had pulled in a bigger crowd at the Giants Stadium in New York.

Among those joining the United hierarchy in the expensive seats that day were Pelé and Henry Kissinger, with those present recalling with some astonishment how the former US secretary of state chomped his way through four hot dogs during the match. “He did seem to love the football too,” one observer remarked.

Four years after the unprecedented Treble in 1999, United were unstoppable as a sporting and commercial powerhouse; they were as successful off the field as they were on it under the guidance of Sir Alex Ferguson.

The US represented a new frontier. “The players loved it there because they could walk around New York and nobody would bother them,” said one former staff member. “But it was a market we needed to break into.

“Two years earlier we had toured Asia, again to break into that market but also to make more of a connection with the global fanbase.” That fanbase is said to be north of 650 million people.

Led at the time of the takeover by the patriarch Malcolm Glazer, the family had made their money from owning and renting shopping malls in America — not that they were going to be sinking any of that wealth into United, thanks to a leveraged buyout built on debt, some at eye-watering interest rates.

The family had shown some interest in sport — buying the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, the American football team, for a then record price of $192 million in 1995 — but there was little in their past that suggested any real interest in association football, still less support for United.

The Glazers’ decision to buy United in 2005 was always a financial one and the use of huge loans to fund the takeover was so controversial that even the club’s chief executive at the time, David Gill, initially opposed it. The family bought up shares to reach the 90.01 per cent level needed to force out any remaining shareholders. Financing the £790 million buyout was an issue until a smart British financier, who worked on the United acquisition while at the bank JP Morgan, came up with a solution.

The Glazers had a £265 million bank loan to help complete the deal but there was still a big gap to fill, and it was the British financier who helped secure the remaining £236 million, using “payment in kind” (PIK) hedge fund loans at an initial interest rate of 14.25 per cent, which had risen to 16.25 per cent when they finally refinanced them five years later. Who was that smart British financier? Ed Woodward.

Fans were furious at the money disappearing out of the club in interest, and documents in 2010 showed that the overall debt had risen to £700 million. It was also revealed at the time that the Glazers had, since 2006, been paid £10 million in “management and administration fees” and the family members had been loaned another £10 million by the club.

It is a measure of how loathed the Glazers’ deal to buy the club remains — especially with more than £1 billion now having been drained from United’s finances — that the recent Chelsea takeover, led by another American in Todd Boehly, included what insiders called “anti-Glazer” terms, such as barring the new owners from paying dividends or management fees until 2032, prohibiting the sale of any shares for ten years and setting strict limits on the level of debt.

The Glazers claim success in increasing United’s commercial clout but, for all the sponsorship deals, they were building on what was already established through the boom years of the 1990s and early 2000s. By the time of the Treble, United had already started their own television channel and forged relationships with companies they regarded as forward-thinking. Sharp were replaced by Vodafone as shirt sponsors, agreeing what at the time — in 2000 — was a groundbreaking £30 million, four-year deal. They had already gone global.

Smart people were making the big decisions, without ever losing sight that the core was success on the field. This continued to be delivered under, Ferguson including three Champions League finals — and one victory — in the four seasons up to 2010-11.

At the heart of the hierarchy remained the four men who had met Ferguson in a motorway service station in 1986 and persuaded him to leave Aberdeen to become their manager; Martin Edwards, Maurice Watkins, Michael Edelson and Sir Bobby Charlton. From the commercial world, they had brought in sharp minds such as Gill, Peter Kenyon and Peter Draper to capitalise on the club’s brilliance on the field.

They did not always get their way. Gill and Kenyon embarked on a mission to sign Ronaldinho from Barcelona, only to suffer an unexpected rejection. But even in defeat they were unflappable.

“F*** him, we’re Manchester United,” Gary Neville reportedly responded when Gill and Kenyon, having flown directly from Spain to join the squad on a flight to the US, informed them of the Brazil midfielder’s decision to stay at the Nou Camp.

When Kenyon stepped down as chief executive to join Chelsea in 2003, Gill made the transition from finance director to CEO and forged a highly effective partnership with Ferguson.

A few months before Kenyon’s departure, the Glazers had bought their first stake in United. Then, 2.9 per cent cost them only £9 million. But what the Glazers perhaps failed to recognise, as their stake and influence grew, was just how skilled Gill was in both managing and supporting the manager.

When Gill stepped down at the same time as Ferguson in 2013, the club was always going to face a huge challenge. The Glazers put all their faith in Woodward, the banker at JP Morgan who had structured their takeover in 2005 and had been put in charge of commercial operations, overseeing a new boom in revenue.

Whatever talent Woodward had for making money, Old Trafford insiders noted how much his approach to Gill differed when it came to working with the manager. Following Ferguson was no easy task but David Moyes might have lasted longer than eight months had Gill, rather than Woodward, been his boss. Sources recall with some regret how little support Moyes received, both from Woodward and the media department.

Woodward’s advancement coincided with another significant change in the way the club was run, with the Glazers, and Joel in particular, becoming more immersed in the decision-making, something that may also have been connected with shares in the club being sold on the New York Stock Exchange in 2012.

During Woodward’s ten years in charge, he and Joel spoke every day at least once, and often several times. Every key decision was authorised by Joel, who was usually based in his Washington DC office, where he is surrounded by United memorabilia, including a giant picture of George Best on the wall.

Whatever criticisms many United fans may have of the Glazer family, it is clear that Joel regards himself as a fan as well as an investor. “Whatever time of day it is in the USA, Joel watches the game on TV. He really lives and breathes it,” said one source who knows him. But neither Joel nor Avi Glazer are regulars at matches — and for obvious reasons, given the hostility their presence could provoke. A new fan group calling itself The 1958 continues to organise protests and insists the relationship between the owners and supporters is irretrievably broken.

Running United from the other side of the Atlantic is also far from Joel Glazer’s only job. The website of the Buccaneers says that their co-chairman “is entering his 27th season overseeing the day-to-day operations of the franchise,” which suggests he has plenty on his plate.

It hardly helped that despite the creation of a football club board at Old Trafford allowing directors such as Gill and Edelson to maintain a connection — with Ferguson also retained on a consultancy basis — the Glazers and Woodward largely ignored this vast wealth of experience. They made key decisions without seeking the counsel of some wise, old heads who understood what it took to make United great.

They thought they knew best. Woodward, who would earn up to £3 million a year, wanted to be involved in everything — encapsulated by splitting his weeks between homes and offices in London and Manchester — but many in football could not understand why he spent almost a decade ignoring advice to bring in a highly knowledgeable director of football to help him with that side of the business.

“People keep saying, ‘What are you going to change?’ And the thing I keep saying is people aren’t going to notice a change.” Joel had told MUTV in 2005 in his one interview at the time of the takeover. But when Ferguson and Gill left, United needed change. They needed a new strategy but, as sponsorship revenues continued to flow, the ability to make money seemed to breed complacency.

Where was the accountability when the team started to falter, and recruitment became increasingly haphazard and managerial changes were in direct contradiction of the proclaimed values of the club (José Mourinho to promote youth and attacking football — really)?

Rivals were investing, improving, modernising to a discernible plan. Manchester City chased Pep Guardiola for years, installing Catalans in the hierarchy to ensure they eventually got their man; Liverpool lured Jürgen Klopp for the long term and recruited smartly to match his clear vision.

What were United doing? Louis van Gaal and Mourinho both complained when commercial demands interfered with their work, which said everything about blurred priorities. The botched appointment of Ralf Rangnick as an interim manager this season, with a view to a longer-term consultancy which has now been scrapped, brought United to a new post-Ferguson nadir.

Old Trafford – a symbol of a decaying club

And so we come to a summer of discernible change, at least in personnel at Old Trafford; a new coach in Ten Hag, recruited from Ajax; Arnold as chief executive since February; new signings to follow (though perhaps even more important are the high-profile departures at a club which has sold even worse than it has bought).

Arnold is said to be a tougher character than Woodward, and he is also likely to leave more of the football decisions and negotiations to others. He is placing a lot of faith in John Murtough, the football director, and Darren Fletcher, the technical director, who both led the recruitment process for Ten Hag and felt he fitted, and interviewed, much better than Mauricio Pochettino.

It is asking a lot of them; Fletcher, the former United midfielder, has always been an admirable individual but he is inexperienced and effectively learning on the job at one of the biggest clubs in the world. Is Murtough the man to drive change on the necessary scale?

Troubling details continue to emerge, however. United explored the possibility of taking Dan Ashworth, the Brighton & Hove Albion technical director, earlier this year — but only after it was revealed that he had been approached by Newcastle United. The informal call came too late and lacked any clarity as to how Ashworth would fit into United’s structure. Ten Hag had to fight to recruit his own backroom staff, including Steve McClaren.

It is no bad thing that there have been significant changes to a failing scouting and recruitment team, with the recent departures of Matt Judge, an investment banker recruited by Woodward, plus chief scout Jim Lawlor and Marcel Bout, who oversaw global scouting.

As one insider says, the football operation is at last properly functioning out of the Carrington training headquarters rather than offices in London. But it remains to be seen if this new sporting department has what it takes to drag United back to the top, to make all the right decisions and to instil a new culture of excellence.

The gradual decline of the Old Trafford stadium on the Glazers’ watch has been symptomatic of so much that has happened over the past decade. It was the nation’s best when they took over but has been overtaken by rivals. The leaks in the roof, allowing water to cascade down, have been an appropriate metaphor for recent results. Plans are now being drawn for a complete, and overdue, refit.

At least the shareholders are winning …

Whatever happens from here, the Glazers have won — certainly in the main respect of what matters to them. Their takeover put a market valuation on United of £790 million. The club has grown in value fourfold and more.

Since 2016, United have been paying an annual dividend to shareholders, with most of it going to the Glazers. Each year, including during the pandemic and when the club has made a financial loss, about £23 million has been paid out in dividends, with the Glazer family sharing about £18 million of that.

Their defenders claim that running the club as a profitable enterprise, with a return for investors, supports a sustainable, long-term approach which is better than depending on a rich benefactor. That cuts little ice with many fans, however, who see the Glazers’ strong support for the European Super League project, despite their efforts to make amends since then, as further evidence of just how far removed they are from the club’s supporters.

On the pitch, there has clearly been a decade of failure. Those close to the Glazers say they understand their responsibility as custodians of the club, and have provided the kind of sums for player investment — £1 billion over ten years — that compares favourably with Abu Dhabi-funded Manchester City.

In June last year, when he finally decided to start talking, Joel Glazer was proud to claim “the highest net transfer spend in world football over the past five years and one of the highest wage bills” without realising that those figures damned the decision-making. All that money — and for what?

The key question is: how much more failure can the club and the fans can endure? Especially while the gap between United and their main rivals, Liverpool and City, appears to be growing.

Those close to the Glazers say there is recognition that the transfer and wages budget has been spent badly over the past ten years, but that things are changing. That means a lot of pressure, and expectation, on the new operation.

A remodelled recruitment team will have to prove that it has learnt from all the mistakes. Ten Hag will need patience as he seeks to show that, after false starts under Moyes, Mourinho, Van Gaal and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer, he is the right man for a job of long-term improvement that enables United to challenge once again for the top honours. Arnold must prove that the club’s priorities have been reset, with football at the forefront.

All change? Even Joel Glazer seems to have realised that being commercially successful is not enough. With the failure of the Super League, there was not some cosy, insulated world of elite clubs to escape into. United might actually have to compete.

There is an attempt to reboot at several levels, including with fan engagement and a bid to soothe at least some of the hatred. The club recently announced the end of the compulsory automatic cup scheme, giving season-ticket holders flexibility over whether they want to opt in or out of attending games in cup competitions, which has long been demanded by MUST.

Joel Glazer has established a Fans’ Advisory Board. Talks continue on the Fans’ Share Scheme, and that pledge to create “the largest fan ownership group” in the world.

Its importance is more symbolic than a genuine shift in control — MUST is campaigning for an initial share issue worth about £10 million to be made available to fans at a club worth billions — but there will at least be a sense of being heard. Shares bought by supporters are due to have the same voting rights as those owned by the Glazers (unlike those which trade on the New York Stock Exchange, which have a tenth of the rights).

Discussions are complicated by the fact that the rest of the Glazer family, some with zero interest in football or United, have to approve the plan. United insist that, despite hugely complex issues around law and regulation, the club remains committed.

“Enough is enough,” Rumfitt says. “We’ve been negotiating a long time. Is this going to happen, or not?” Good question — it points to the heart of the problem. When are the Glazers going to deliver on anything except their own business interests?

Who are the Glazers?

Malcolm Glazer took control of United in 2005. When he died in 2014, the family’s 90 per cent stake was split between his six children

Joel Glazer

Executive co-chairman of United since 2005 and also of NFL’s Tampa Bay Bucs. Said to have led six companies.

Avram Glazer

Executive co-chairman of United. Previously president of the Zapata Corporation from 2002 to 2009.

Bryan Glazer

Director of United and co-chairman of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Serves on NFL’s digital media committee.

Edward Glazer

Director at United and co-chairman of the Buccaneers.

Kevin Glazer

United director. Founder of Glazer Properties, a leasing company.

Darcie Glazer Kassewitz

United director.

– The Times